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Abstract: g—a statistical factor capturing intercorrelations between scores on different IQ tests—is of 
theoretical interest despite being a low-fidelity model of both folk psychological intelligence and its 
cognitive/neural underpinnings. g idealizes away from those aspects of cognitive/neural mechanisms that 
are not explanatory of the relevant variety of folk psychological intelligence, and idealizes away from those 
varieties of folk psychological intelligence that are not generated by the relevant cognitive/neural substrate. 
In this manner, g constitutes a high-fidelity bridge model of the relationship between its two targets, and 
thereby helps demystify the relationship between folk and scientific psychology. 
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1. Introduction. 
Psychometric g is a statistical factor that captures the intercorrelations between all of any 
given individual’s scores on different IQ tests and subtests (probing verbal ability, mathematical 
ability, analogical reasoning, pattern-matching, and so on). The first great finding of the IQ-
testing tradition is that subjects who do better than most people on any given one of these subtests 
are also likely to do better than most people on any of the others (Mackintosh 2011). g is thus 
commonly considered a statistical distillation of what all IQ subtests measure in common. The 
second great finding of the IQ-testing tradition is that g is predictively fecund—among 
psychological constructs, only conscientiousness competes with g as a predictor of educational 
attainment, job complexity, socioeconomic status, and other prominent measures of success in 
life (Gottfredson 1997). Nevertheless, experts are divided about its theoretical interest. 
Some skeptics deny that g measures anything more theoretically interesting than the 
ability to do well on IQ tests, but most intelligence researchers assume that g is a very good model 
of something of theoretical interest, which they variously refer to as ‘the g-factor’, ‘general 
intelligence’, or ‘the positive manifold’. Non-skeptics use these terms to pick out one of two target 
systems. g is purported to be a model of either folk psychological intelligence—the personal-level 
capacity that ordinary folks invoke when they call somebody “smart” or “stupid”—or the 
cognitive (or neural) substrate of that capacity. 
In this article, I’ll propose that g is of theoretical interest despite being a low-fidelity model 
of each of these targets. In §2, I’ll assume that g isn’t a very good measure of folk psychological 
intelligence. In §3, I’ll argue that it isn’t a very good measure of what’s going on in the brains or 
cognitive systems of (un)intelligent people, either. Finally, in §4, I’ll suggest that g is nevertheless 
explanatorily interesting insofar as it idealizes away from those aspects of the relevant 
neural/cognitive substrates that aren’t explanatory of the relevant variety folk psychological 
intelligence, and idealizes away from those aspects of the relevant variety of folk psychological 
intelligence that aren’t generated by the relevant neural/cognitive substrates. In that manner, g 
constitutes a high-fidelity bridge model of the relationship between its two distinct targets, and 
thereby helps demystify the relationship between folk psychology and scientific psychology.  
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2. g isn’t a very good measure of folk psychological intelligence. 
Elsewhere (Curry forthcoming), I have argued for an interpretivist account of intelligence: 
to be intelligent, in the sense invoked in folk psychological practices, is to be comparatively good 
at solving intellectual problems that an interpreter deems worth solving. In short, you’re 
intelligent if you behave (in ways that folks deem smart) more successfully than other people, 
and you’re unintelligent if you behave (in ways that folk deem smart) less successfully than other 
people. Since the extant empirical evidence indicates that different lay interpreters deem different 
intellectual problems worth solving (and, indeed, deem different problems intellectual), it follows 
from my definition that what it is to be intelligent varies alongside the lay interpreters in question. 
As Sternberg and Grigorenko (2004) and their collaborators in cross-cultural psychology 
have documented, g tracks some—but not all—of the varieties of intelligence that have emerged 
in relation to folk psychological practices around the globe. g is plausibly a decent model of 
varieties of intelligence that became salient in the dominant folk psychological discourses of some 
WEIRD—Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic (Henrich et al. 2010)—contexts in 
the 20th century. But WEIRD-intelligences are much less salient in other cultural contexts. 
Moreover, skeptical philosophers and psychologists have provided serious reasons to doubt that 
g is a very good measure even of the varieties of folk psychological intelligence that have emerged, 
alongside IQ testing itself (Hacking 1999, 73), within WEIRD contexts (Block and Dworkin 1974; 
Alfano, Holden, and Conway 2016). So I’ll henceforth assume that g isn’t a very good measure of 
what folks are talking about when they talk about intelligence in everyday life: it doesn’t 
straightforwardly measure intelligence as conceptualized in IQ-test-influenced settings, and it 
fails to measure intelligence as conceptualized in many other settings.1  
Nevertheless, my account of folk psychological intelligence leaves open the possibility 
that g is a great measure of the neural or cognitive underpinnings of what folks are talking about 
when they talk about intelligence.  
 
3. g isn’t a very good measure of cognitive or neural functioning. 
Some psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists are increasingly optimistic about 
unearthing a (set of) neural or cognitive mechanism(s) that is fully responsible for the 
comparatively superior (or inferior) capacity measured by g, and thereby discovering intelligence 
squarely in the brain or cognitive system. I think their optimism about reduction is misplaced. To 
substantiate my pessimism, I’ll examine a few prominent recent attempts to reduce intelligence 
to its neural or cognitive substrates. 
 
3.1. Neural correlates. 
Jensen (2006, ix), in a refinement of Spearman’s (1927, 117) original speculation that g 
measures a kind of “mental energy”, interprets g as an indirect “measurement of cognitive speed” 
which could be more directly measured via reaction time paradigms which correlate strongly 
with g. Because of this correlation, Jensen was convinced that “intelligence is the periodicity of 
 
1 The central argument of this article relies neither on the details of my account of folk psychological 
intelligence nor on my view that g doesn’t straightforwardly measure any variety of intelligence. Indeed, g 
would serve as a more explanatorily powerful bridge model if it were a great measure of (a variety of) folk 
psychological intelligence. 
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neural oscillation in the action potentials of the brain and central nervous system” (2011, 173). In 
other words, intelligence is nothing more than the frequency of brainwaves, and IQ testing 
provides a reliable (if indirect) measure of this physical feature of the brain.  
Jensen’s simple reductionist theory hasn’t held up in the light of PET and fMRI research. 
Cognitive neuroscientists have demonstrated that a higher frequency of brainwaves isn’t 
straightforwardly correlated with greater neural processing power; nor is any other particular 
pattern in the frequency of brainwaves (Haier 2017). Despite Jensen’s best efforts, Spearman’s 
notion of mental energy has no neural referent. Nevertheless, more empirically adequate 
neurological theories of intelligence have risen in Jensen’s theory’s stead. 
The best developed among them—Jung and Haier’s Parieto-Frontal Integration Theory—
goes a long way towards identifying the neural correlates of the cognitive processes recruited 
when people take IQ tests. There is something to Jung and Haier’s suggestion that the efficient 
integrated operation of a parieto-frontal sense-remember-judge-act network underlies varieties 
of intelligence purportedly measured by g. (It plausibly partially underlies other varieties of folk 
psychological intelligence as well.) But Jung and Haier have no proposal as to the cause of this 
efficiency, which could stem from a wide variety of sources, only some of which could be 
plausibly construed as the incarnation of intelligence in the brain. Indeed, in responding to critics, 
Jung and Haier back off of the claim to have provided a reductionist theory of the positive 
manifold modelled by g, and instead insist only that “in our view, it is still too early to rule out a 
neural basis for a general factor of intelligence independent of a neural basis for specific cognitive 
abilities” (2007, 176). In other words, Jung and Haier insist that it is possible that the neural 
efficiency which underlies successful IQ-test-taking is generated by intelligence qua mechanism 
in the brain. They claim to have located that mechanism in a reasonably delimited parieto-frontal 
network. But they make no claim to have identified the mechanism itself.  
Localization isn’t nearly enough to ground reduction. If researchers hope to reduce 
intelligence to a neural—or, failing that, cognitive—state or process, then they must first identify 
a candidate mechanism that produces that state or carries out that process. The most promising 
candidate currently on offer is working memory capacity. 
 
3.2. Working memory. 
 The term ‘working memory’ refers to “a domain-general resource that enables 
representations to be actively sustained, rehearsed, and manipulated for purposes of reasoning 
and problem solving” (Carruthers 2015, 12). When you rehearse a phone number in your head 
while looking for a piece of paper to scribble it down on, you’re using your working memory. 
Working memory capacity is a common measure both of how much information can be 
maintained in working memory and of how well that information can be processed. Many 
cognitive scientists take working memory capacity to be a critical component of most complex 
cognition, and have thus become increasingly interested in the hypothesis that intelligence can 
be explained largely in terms thereof—perhaps even reduced thereto. 
 This hypothesis makes some intuitive sense: solving intellectual problems usually 
involves actively sustaining and manipulating information. And, at first glance, the evidence in 
favor of reducing intelligence to working memory capacity is impressive. When you give 
somebody both an IQ test and a test of working memory capacity, the two resulting scores 
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correlate positively. In particular, working memory capacity correlates with ‘fluid g’—the factor 
capturing performance on IQ tests designed to probe pure reasoning, as opposed to reasoning 
that makes use of what the reasoner knows—somewhere between .6 and .8 (Carruthers 2015). 
Moreover, much of the parieto-frontal network that Jung and Haier identify as the neural 
correlate of g has also been shown to be active in working memory (Deary et al. 2010).  Finally, 
there is some evidence that increases in working memory capacity yield increases in fluid g 
(Jaušovec and Jaušovec 2012). 
On the other hand, there is evidence that cuts against reduction. Working memory 
capacity, while quite domain-general, is nevertheless more domain-specific than fluid g: it 
correlates more with tests of verbal ability than with tests of spatial ability, for instance. And 
working memory’s contribution to performance on tests of fluid g seems to be independent of the 
respective contributions of associative learning and information processing speed (Mackintosh 
2011, 154–155). So there is reason to doubt that working memory is the sole cognitive 
underpinning of fluid g. Moreover, there is some reason to doubt that working memory is a 
cognitive underpinning of intelligence at all: some of the researchers responsible for discovering 
the correlations between fluid g and working memory capacity have argued that the two are 
explanatorily distinct phenomena that are nevertheless strongly correlated because they share a 
common underpinning (Shipstead and Engle 2018).  
For present purposes, these complex questions about the weight and interpretation of the 
extant evidence can be set aside. My argument against reducing intelligence to working memory 
capacity instead rests on the premise that the attempted reduction would add nothing to, and 
subtract something from, scientists’ understanding. In particular, an attempt at reduction would 
hinder scientists’ understanding of intelligence while adding nothing to their understanding of 
how cognitive systems work. 
With regard to the latter: working memory capacity is already a well-defined construct 
that measures the operations of a central and reasonably well-delimited (albeit complex and 
distributed) cognitive subsystem, and thereby plays a reasonably clear explanatory role in 
cognitive science (cf. Gomez-Lavin forthcoming). Stipulating that this construct is a measure of 
intelligence—without making any suggestions for how that stipulation should change scientists’ 
understanding of working memory or the functioning of cognitive systems more generally—does 
nothing to enhance its explanatory power. Thus, an attempt at reduction is justified in this case 
only if it sheds light on the phenomenon being reduced. 
But reduction to working memory capacity can only obfuscate intelligence. Even granting 
that IQ tests measure intelligence well, any attempted reduction of intelligence to working 
memory capacity hinders scientists’ understanding of intelligence in at least two respects.  
First, working memory capacity is impressively highly correlated, not with g, but only 
with one of its component factors, fluid g, which is derived from a minority subset of IQ tests. 
Most IQ tests also measure other component factors, including most prominently ‘crystallized 
g’—the factor capturing how well people do on IQ tests that are designed to focus on reasoning 
that makes use of what the reasoner knows. The calling card of plain old undifferentiated g is that 
there are strong intercorrelations between how well people do on all IQ tests, including relatively 
pure tests of fluid g, relatively pure tests of crystallized g, and a wide range of hybrids. The 
heterogeneous nature of the positive manifold should be telling when it comes to constructing a 
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theory of intelligence: the fact that both fluid g and crystallized g are statistical components of 
undifferentiated g intriguingly mirrors the fact that folk psychological conceptions of intelligence 
across cultures tend to invoke both fluid reasoning and the use of crystalized knowledge 
(Sternberg and Grigorenko 2004). Meanwhile, the correlation of crystallized intelligence and 
working memory capacity, like the correlation of undifferentiated g and working memory 
capacity, is somewhere between .3 and .6 (Mackintosh 2011)—the two are clearly related, but it is 
equally clear that a direct reduction of one to the other won’t be in the offing. 
It is possible that fluid g captures the essence of g (and, by extension, of folk psychological 
intelligence), and that crystallized g is more noise than signal. The IQ tests with the highest g-
loadings—that correlate most strongly with g itself—tend to be tests of fluid intelligence (like 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices). But there is a case to be made that even fluid g measures 
personality, motivation, temperament, or worldliness to a large degree—it may measure 
ambition, patience, or test-wiseness as well as pure reasoning capacity (Block and Dworkin 
1974)—and these characteristics aren’t plausibly reduced to working memory capacity. Indeed, 
my account of folk psychological intelligence suggests that these character traits are (sometimes) 
rightly taken to be part and parcel of intelligence: intelligence is the capacity to solve intellectual 
problems comparatively well, and solving problems better than one’s peers takes grit as well as 
wit (Morton and Paul 2019). 
A scientist bent on reduction would likely be undeterred by this first pitfall. They could 
retort that, by shedding inessential character traits, working memory capacity distills the essence 
of fluid g, which itself, by shedding crystallized knowledge, distills the essence of 
undifferentiated g. Regardless, a second pitfall awaits the attempt to reduce fluid g to working 
memory capacity (and indeed any attempted reduction of a psychometric kind to the workings 
of a cognitive mechanism). 
Even if working memory capacity is the single essential cognitive underpinning of 
intelligence, g isn’t a very good model thereof. That’s because the g-factor is, by its very nature, 
comparative—it is an inter- (rather than intra-) individual construct that measures how somebody 
does on IQ tests relative to other people in their age-cohort. It doesn’t measure how smart 
somebody is on a ratio scale; it measures only how much better or worse they perform than the 
average IQ-test-taker. g thus can’t directly measure an intrinsic characteristic of any individual’s 
mind, whereas we already have reliable ways of measuring working memory capacity within a 
single individual on a ratio scale. (To my mind, this is a salutary fact about g, since on my 
definition folk psychological intelligence is also constitutively comparative.) As Borsboom and 
colleagues (2009, 79) have pointed out, absent a theory of how to bridge differential and cognitive 
psychology, “intelligence dimensions like the g-factor cannot be understood on the basis of 
between-subject data as denoting mental ability qua within-subject attribute.” Fluid g couldn’t be 
comprehensibly reduced to working memory capacity absent a unifying theory of how 
constitutively comparative capacities relate to cognitive mechanisms. 
In contrast, it bears repeating that cognitive psychologists already have a decent 
theoretical understanding of the mechanics of working memory capacity in its own right, not to 
mention reliable instruments that measure it on a ratio scale. And theorists can give working 
memory capacity due emphasis as a cognitive underpinning of intelligence without making an 
attempt at reduction. Thus, in attempting reduction, nothing new is learned, some of the plausibly 
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explanatorily salient dimensions of both folk psychological intelligence and g are elided, and an 
important distinction—between the intrapersonality of the cognitive mechanism of working 
memory and the constitutive interpersonality of intelligence—is obscured. So long as there is a 
viable nonreductive account of intelligence on the table, reduction carries no explanatory benefits 
and falls into at least two significant explanatory pitfalls. 
And there are viable nonreductive accounts on the table. Rather than measuring a 
cognitive mechanism itself, g plausibly measures an effect of the interactions of several 
mechanisms, rendering the positive manifold “an emergent property of anatomically distinct 
cognitive systems, each of which has its own capacity” (Hampshire et al. 2012, 1225). At its 
extreme, this approach leads to the conclusion that “g is ‘not a thing’ but instead is a summary 
statistic” and thus that “the search for the neural basis of g is meaningless” (Conway and Kovacs 
2018, 59). If viable, this approach would avoid both pitfalls of reducing intelligence to working 
memory: it wouldn’t exclude features of the positive manifold on an ad hoc basis, and it would 
have the flexibility to countenance the constitutively comparative nature of the positive manifold. 
 
3.3. Mutualism. 
In that spirit, van der Maas and colleagues (2006) have vigorously argued that the 
intercorrelations between individuals’ IQ test scores can be explained by reference to the dynamic 
interplay of specialized cognitive mechanisms. They analogize g to the results of predator-prey 
dynamics in ecology. According to the Lotka-Volterra model, high correlations between predator 
and prey populations needn’t be caused by a single underlying factor (e.g. shared food source) 
which bolsters both populations. Instead, the correlation can be caused by dynamic interactions 
between the two populations. The size of the prey population increases when the size of the 
predator population is small (because breeding outpaces being eaten), and decreases when the 
predator population is large (because being eaten outpaces breeding). At the same time, the 
predator population grows when the prey population is large (because eating enables breeding), 
and decreases when the prey population is small (because there isn’t enough food to go around). 
These dynamics ensure that a strong correlation between the size of the populations emerges over 
time, without requiring any underlying factor to influence both populations. 
Analogously, van der Maas and colleagues have demonstrated that high correlations 
between the performance of distinct cognitive mechanisms, which each undergird performance 
on some IQ subtest or other, needn’t be caused by a particular underlying factor which fuels each 
performance. Instead, the correlations are plausibly caused by dynamic interactions between the 
distinct cognitive mechanisms. Research in cognitive psychology reveals that such relationships 
exist. Short-term memory improves the development of cognitive strategies, and cognitive 
strategies improve the efficiency of short-term memory (Siegler and Alibali 2005). Language 
production and reasoning are similarly mutually beneficial: if you can think through it, then you 
can put it into words better, and if you can put it into words better, then that helps you think 
through it better (Fisher et al. 1994). And so on. These sorts of dynamic interactions between 
distinct cognitive mechanisms generate positive feedback loops, ensuring that strong correlations 
emerge over time between how well mechanisms function across the cognitive system. 
g is an explanandum, not the explanans, of the mutualistic functioning of cognitive 
mechanisms. If theorists force g into the role of explanans, then they’ll find that it is, at best, a 
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low-fidelity model of that functioning: it idealizes away from all of the independently interesting, 
messy and complex mechanistic details. Van der Maas and colleagues (2014) go on to infer that g 
is of theoretical interest only as something to be explained; it is a predictively powerful construct, 
but it doesn’t itself do any interesting explanatory work. 
 
4. g as bridge model. 
Although I accept most of van der Maas’s story, I think this last inference is mistaken. 
Researchers interested in the mind tend to investigate one or the other of two broad categories of 
phenomena: they investigate the objects of folk psychological interpretations (in what Sellars 
(1963) termed “the ‘manifest’ image of man-in-the-world”) or they investigate the wiring-and-
connections constituting cognitive mechanisms (in the ‘scientific’ image). As Godfrey-Smith has 
argued, echoing Sellars, “one of the roles for philosophy … is to describe the coordination 
between the facts about interpretations and the facts about wirings-and-connections” (2004, 149). 
On my view, g is a theoretically interesting explanans when cast in precisely that role. Van der 
Maas and his fellow mutualists should embrace the idea that g does explanatory work, not as a 
model of mechanisms, but as a bridge model that illuminates the relationship between folk 
psychological intelligence and the functioning (and neurophysiological realization) of cognitive 
systems. 
On Weisberg’s (2013) influential account, models are (concrete, mathematical, or 
computational) structures plus construals—scientists’ interpretations of those structures as 
descriptions of target systems. Bridge models, as I’m coining the term, are structures that scientists 
construe as describing the relationship between two or more target systems. Bridge models are 
particularly useful as guides to the relationships between systems targeted at different levels (or 
otherwise partially incommensurate varieties) of scientific explanation.2 Most explanatorily 
powerful models idealize away many irrelevant features of their target systems. In the case of 
bridge models, this means ignoring many (if not all) of the features of each of the target 
phenomena that aren’t directly related to the other target phenomenon. 
My positive proposal is that the same idealizations and abstractions that render g a low-
fidelity model of both folk psychological intelligence and its cognitive underpinnings also render 
it a high-fidelity bridge model. By distilling the common core of IQ-test-taking-ability, g idealizes 
away from the mechanistic details of cognitive functioning other than the fact that cognitive 
systems produce a positive manifold. At the same time, g also idealizes away from the aspects 
(indeed, whole varieties) of folk psychological intelligence that aren’t tracked by performance on 
IQ subtests. Nevertheless, under the proper respective construals, g serves as a low-fidelity model 
of each of these phenomena. In so doing, it doesn’t allow researchers to get a very firm grasp on 
either the folk psychology or the cognitive psychology of intelligence. But, properly construed, it 
could allow theorists to get a firmer grasp on the relationship between these two varieties of 
psychological explanation. In Sellarsian jargon: g, construed as a bridge model, could help fuse 
the manifest and scientific images of intelligence into one synoptic vision. 
 
2 For example, Daniel Dennett (personal communication) has suggested that the Psychopathy Checklist 
might be fruitfully construed as a bridge model spanning psychopathy (qua personality disorder) and its 
neural underpinnings. 
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As construed by van der Maas, g doesn’t provide a mechanistic explanation, but it does 
capture the fact that cognitive mechanisms dynamically work together to form a general substrate 
for the constitutively comparative problem-solving capacities that constitute the relevant variety 
of folk psychological intelligence. Taken from the other direction, g is, at best, a low-fidelity model 
of folk psychological intelligence: it idealizes away from the multifarious cross-cultural 
differences between folks’ conceptions of intelligence, and from many of the messy and complex 
details within conceptions. Nevertheless, g is a high-fidelity model of those aspects of folk 
psychological intelligence that are realized by the mutualistic network of cognitive mechanisms 
that subserves IQ-test-taking-ability. 
When properly construed as a bridge model, g thereby helps reveal why one variety of 
lay intelligence attribution is genuinely powerfully predictive (and in some senses explanatory) 
of human behavior. An idealization of the attributed suite of constitutively comparative problem-
solving capacities maps onto a predictively fecund idealization of the dynamic interactions 
between cognitive mechanisms. 
By the same token, treating g as a bridge model is explanatory of its own high correlation 
with certain measures of success in life. g isn’t a great measure of any particular aspect of 
cognitive functioning. Nor is it a great measure of any particular folk conception of intelligence. 
But it does help researchers zero in on those aspects of cognitive functioning—the relevant 
mechanisms and their interactions—that undergird core features of some culturally salient folk 
conceptions of intelligence. In other words, it is a good isolator of the features of cognitive 
functioning that many people value when they value intelligence—and thus of the aspects of 
cognitive functioning that lead to certain kinds of success in a society partly structured by 
people’s values. 
Researchers make a mistake when they infer that g must be a great measure of cognitive 
functioning, since it is so predictive of success. On the contrary, we should expect g qua bridge 
model to correlate with success better than any great direct measure of cognitive functioning. 
After all, most folks (and their social institutions) don’t care a whit about rewarding cognitive 
functioning per se—they care about rewarding those people whose cognitive functioning has put 
them in a position to accomplish valued goals. At the same time, we should also expect g qua 
bridge model to correlate with success better than any great direct measure of intelligence as it 
emerges in relation to any given folk conception, since it zeroes in on aspects of folk psychological 
intelligence that are actually undergirded by more or less efficient and effective cognitive 
functioning. 
I’ll conclude by drawing a lateral philosophical lesson. Psychofunctionalists sometimes 
claim that belief attribution must literally describe cognitive functioning, since it is predictively 
fecund (Fodor 1987). There is something to this thought: the predictive power of belief attribution 
suggests that folk psychological beliefs must be reliably undergirded by patterns of cognitive 
functioning. Nevertheless, construing g as a bridge model highlights how intelligence attribution 
manages to be similarly predictively fecund without literally describing cognitive functioning. 
The predictive fecundity of belief attribution shows, at most, that if scientists were to construct 
the relevant bridge model, then they’d find a reliable relationship between some aspects of folk 
psychological belief and some cognitive underpinnings that are responsible for behaviors that 
can be predicted via belief attribution. It can’t show that folk psychological belief is reducible to 
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those cognitive underpinnings: intelligence attribution is similarly predictively powerful despite 
being irreducible.  
Of course, this lesson doesn’t disprove psychofunctionalism about belief. Some reductions 
of folk psychological phenomena to cognitive phenomena are well-founded. But I have argued 
that, intrapersonally speaking, human cognitive architectures don’t feature anything well-labeled 
‘intelligence’. It is still an open question, which won’t be settled by appeals to the predictive 
power of belief attribution, whether they feature anything well-labeled ‘beliefs’. 
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